

Part 21 (PAR)

Event # 48621

| | | | |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------------------|---|-------|
| Rep Org: ABB INC. | | Notification Date / Time: 12/21/2012 16:27 (EST) | |
| Supplier: ABB INC. | | Event Date / Time: 10/25/2012 (EST) | |
| Last Modification: 12/21/2012 | | | |
| Region: 1 | Docket #: | | |
| City: CORAL SPRINGS | Agreement State: Yes | | |
| County: | License #: | | |
| State: FL | | | |
| NRC Notified by: BRYAN TAUZER | | Notifications: GORDON HUNEGS | R1DO |
| HQ Ops Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | | BRIAN BONSER | R2DO |
| Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY | | KENNETH RIEMER | R3DO |
| 10 CFR Section: | | BLAIR SPITZBERG | R4DO |
| 21.21(a)(2) | INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION | PART 21 GROUP | EMAIL |

DEFECT DISCOVERED IN COM-5 AND SSC-T PROTECTIVE RELAYS DISTRIBUTED BY ABB, INC.

The following information was obtained by ABB, Inc. via fax:

"ABB Coral Springs received notice from ABB Inc. in Florence, South Carolina of a return request by NextEra Energy (Point Beach Nuclear Plant) for one of [their] COM-5 relays. The customer complaint was identified as 'A pin on the telephone relay fell out'.

"ABB Coral Springs received the relay on October 25, 2012 with the telephone relay armature and armature pivot pin disassembled. The assembly process for the telephone relay armature calls for the armature pivot pin to have a knurl at one end and a flare at the opposite end. The knurl and flare secures the armature to the pivot pin. [ABB's] investigation found that on this telephone relay, the pivot pin was flared on the same end as that which had the knurl. It was determined that this was due to an operator error while performing a secondary operation.

"The telephone relay was stamped with a manufacturing date code 08-38, indicating the thirty-eighth week of 2008. It is important to note the date of manufacture, as in mid-2010 the supplier and the assembly manufacturing process of the pin was changed. The hole and flaring was changed such that it is performed prior to cutting the pin to length, eliminating the secondary operation and potential for error.

"In addition to the change to the flaring process described above, corrective action includes the addition of an additional step to [ABB's] final Product Inspection procedure where all telephone relays are verified to have the knurl at one end of the armature pivot pin and a flare at the opposite end.

"Inspection of [ABB's] stock identified no similar condition.

IE19
NRR

Part 21 (PAR)

Event # 48621

"[ABB has] identified COM-5 and SSC-T relays which shipped that may have a telephone relay of the same vintage as that of the subject telephone relay. There were eleven orders shipped, totaling twenty-five units to three customers; ABB Inc. Florence, S.C., Exelon Business Services and WESCO Distribution, Inc.. ABB has determined that it does not have the capability to perform an evaluation to determine if a defect exists, and therefore in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(b), [ABB is] notifying [their] affected customers so that they may evaluate the deviation or failure to comply, pursuant to 10 CFR 21(a).

"A failure of the Telephone Relay to operate on either the COM-5 or SSC-T relay can result in the breaker not tripping during an overload condition. This condition could compromise the ability of the relay to perform its intended safety function.

"[ABB is] providing [their] customers with the option of inspecting for evidence of the knurl and flare or returning the relays so [they] may perform the inspection."



December 21, 2012

Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject: 10 C.F.R. Part 21 Notification to Customers – COM-5 and SSC-T Protective Relays
– Telephone Relay Armature Pivot Pin

Notification By: ABB Inc.
Distribution Automation
4300 Coral Ridge Drive
Coral Springs, FL 33065

Dear Sir or Madam,

ABB Coral Springs received notice from ABB Inc. in Florence, South Carolina of a return request by NextEra Energy (Point Beach Nuclear Plant) for one of our COM-5 relays. The customer complaint was identified as “A pin on the telephone relay fell out”.

ABB Coral Springs received the relay on October 25, 2012 with the telephone relay armature and armature pivot pin disassembled. The assembly process for the telephone relay armature calls for the armature pivot pin to have a knurl at one end and a flare at the opposite end. The knurl and flare secures the armature to the pivot pin. Our investigation found that on this telephone relay, the pivot pin was flared on the same end as that which had the knurl. It was determined that this was due to an operator error while performing a secondary operation.

The telephone relay was stamped with a manufacturing date code 08-38, indicating the thirty-eighth week of 2008. It is important to note the date of manufacture, as in mid 2010 the supplier and the assembly manufacturing process of the pin was changed. The hole and flaring was changed such that it is performed prior to cutting the pin to length, eliminating the secondary operation and potential for error.

In addition to the change to the flaring process described above, corrective action includes the addition of an additional step to our final Product Inspection procedure where all telephone relays are verified to have the knurl at one end of the armature pivot pin and a flare at the opposite end.

Inspection of our stock identified no similar condition.

We have identified COM-5 and SSC-T relays which shipped that may have a telephone relay of the same vintage as that of the subject telephone relay. There were eleven orders shipped, totaling twenty-five units to three customers; ABB Inc. Florence, S.C., Exelon Business Services and WESCO Distribution, Inc. Please see Attachment 1. ABB has determined that it does not have the capability to perform an evaluation to determine if a defect exists, and therefore in accordance with 10 C.F.R. 21.21(b), we are notifying our affected customers so that they may evaluate the deviation or failure to comply, pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 21(a).



A failure of the Telephone Relay to operate on either the COM-5 or SSC-T relay can result in the breaker not tripping during an overload condition. This condition could compromise the ability of the relay to perform its intended safety function.

We are providing our customers with the option of inspecting for evidence of the knurl and flare or returning the relays so we may perform the inspection.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Bryan Tauzer'.

For Dennis Batovsky
Managing Director